In this work, we recapitulate and compare the market game approaches provided by Shapley and Shubik (1977) and Schmeidler (1980). We provide some extensions to economies with infinitely many commodities and point out some applications and lines for future research.
1 Introduction a i = (a i 1 , a i 2 , . . . , a i m , a i m+1 ), and a concave utility function, U i : IR m+1 + → IR. 105 Although it is considered that U i depends on (x i 1 , x i 2 , . . . , x i m , x i m+1 ), we emphasize 106 that U i need not actually depend on x i m+1 ; the possibility of a fiat money is not 107 excluded.
108
Let us imagine m separate trading posts, one for each of the first m commo-109 dities, where the total supplies (ā 1 , . . . ,ā m ), withā j = n i=1 a i j , j = 1, . . . , m, assumed to be positive, have been deposited for sale "on consignment."
111
Each trader makes bids by allocating amounts of his (m + 1)th commodity among the m trading posts. Thus, the strategy set for trader (or player) i is:
The price formation rule and the allocation mechanism are as follows. For each strategy profile b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) and each commodity j = 1, . . . , m, let p j (b) be defined by
Now for every trader i consider the bundle x i (b) given by
for each j = 1, . . . , m; and
The payoff function for player i is Π i (b) = U i (x i (b)), that is
Given a strategy profile b, let b −i denote the strategies of all players except i.
112
A Nash equilibrium is a profile b * such that Π i (b * ) ≥ Π i (b * −i , s) for every s ∈ S i 113 and every player i.
114 Shapley and Shubik (1977) obtain the following results. The first theorem 115 states existence of equilibrium for the market game and the second one is a 116 convergence theorem that relates the equilibria of the game to the competitive 117 equilibria.
118
Theorem 1. For each trader i = 1, . . . , n, let U i be continuous, concave, and 119 nondecreasing. For each good j = 1, ..., m, let there be at least two traders with 120 positive initial endowments of good m + 1 whose utility for good j is strictly 121 increasing. Then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Let (rE, r ∈ IN) be the sequence of replicated economies, being rE the economy with r agents of each type i = 1, . . . , n. A trader of type i is characterized by 127 endowments a i and the utility function U i .
128
Theorem 2. Assume that for infinitely many values of r the market has trades.
140
To propose a more direct route from Nash to Walras, Dubey and Geanakoplos much to bid at each trading-post for purchases. This inside fiat money is the sole 145 medium of exchange and it must be repaid to the bank after trade. To trigger the 146 trade, an external agent also bids one dollar at each trading post. The bank, the 147 external agent and the trading-posts are all assumed to be strategic dummies.
148
To simplify the reasoning, they consider a continuum of players with a finite 149 number n of different types. However, their argument works as well when the 150 finite number of agents of each type increases. As in Shapley-Shubik's game, for 151 every commodity j = 1, . . . , m, there is a "trading-post" and agents put up their 152 entire endowment of that commodity for sale and (fiat) money for purchase.
153
For each fixed amount of money M, a game Γ(M ) in normal form is defined.
154
In this game, the strategy set for each player is
Assuming that agents are representatives of their type, that is, all agents of b = (b i ) i∈N defines a price system blue p(b), where the price of commodity j is given by
Each player of type i obtains the consumption bundle 
The payoff of agents of type i, for symmetric profiles, is given by
The max term reflects the fact the agents gain no utility from fiat money, but 167 are penalized from defaulting on their loans. to her budget set at the announced prices. That is, the strategy set for player i 195 is:
A strategy profile s is given by a strategy s i for every player i ∈ N = 197 {1, . . . , n}. We denote s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) = ((x 1 , p 1 ), (x 2 , p 2 ), . . . , (x n , p n )).
198
Schmeidler's (1980) proposal is crystal: agents trade only if they agree on the prices. Following this idea, given a strategy profile, each player trades only with those individuals that select the same price. Thus, for each profile s = ((x 1 , p 1 ), (x 2 , p 2 ), . . . , (x n , p n )), let A i (s) = {j ∈ I = {1, · · · , n} p j = p i } and let #A i (s) denote the cardinality of the set A i (s), i.e, the number of players that choose the price selected by the ith one in the profile s. Then, the average excess
Each player receives the bundle they choose adjusted by the average excess of demand of the players that proposes the same price. That is, given s, the player 1 To describe the game and the main result we do not use the same notation that appears in Schmeidler (1980) since we state the game in terms of trades whereas in Schmeidler's paper it is written in terms of net trade instead.
2 The set of prices is the the simplex {p ∈ IR + | h=1 p h = 1}.
i gets the bundle
Finally, the payoff function for player i is Π i (s) = U i (f i (s)).
199
The strategy profile s * is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentives to
for every s i ∈ S i and every i.
201
The profile s * is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition of players has in-202 centives to modify their strategies as a group.
203
The main result proved by Schmeidler (1980) is the next theorem.
204
Theorem. Let E be an economy with n ≥ 3. Let G be the associated game.
205
The following statements hold:
is a strong Nash equilibrium of G.
208
(ii) If s * is a Nash equilibrium of the game G, all the players choose the same 209 price p * and ((f i (s * ) i∈N , p * ) is an equilibrium of the economy E.
210
The proof of the above result follows several steps showing that if s * is a Nash 211 equilibrium of the game G then 212 • Given two different players i, j, we have f i (s * ) i d i (p j ), where d i denotes 213 the demand function of agent i.
214
• If at least one more trader selects the same price p as player i,
. . , n} and all of them get the 217 demand at the chosen price.
218
• #A i (s * ) > 1 for some i.
219
The most significant drawback of Schmeidler's (1980) approach is the non-220 feasibility of the individual allocations for some strategy profiles. In fact, it though the treatment of money in a strategic market game has been a sub-235 ject of intense debate, it was described by Shapley (1976) in these terms:
236
The decisive step was to meet the problem of money head on -to accept 237 the proposition that, in the world of buying and selling, money is "real."
238
Granting this, the rest falls into place with remarkably few other generality-239 restricting assumptions. around.
273
We remark that in both aforementioned market game no price player is in- where a consumption plan is a sequence of points in R + for each time period 282 t = 1, 2, . . .. Each consumer i is characterized by a preference relation i defined on the consumption set + ∞ and by endowments ω i ∈ + ∞ .
284
A price system is an element of the dual space of ∞ , denoted by ∞ . A
285
Walrasian equilibrium is a pair ((x 1 , . . . x n ), p) ∈ ( + ∞ ) n × ∞ , with p = 0, such 286 that n i=1 x i = n i=1 ω i and, for every i, the consumption plan
Under the assumptions of interiority of endowments (i.e., there exists ε > 0 289 such that ω i,k > ε for every natural number k and every i = 1, . . . , n) and is characterized by the preference relation t = i and by endowments ω t = ω i .
296
Under the assumptions on endowments and preferences previously stablished,
297
the economy E has an equilibrium (x, p), with p ∈ 1 . It is easy to see that (x, p) (2003) with no external agent and where the strategy sets for each consumer of type i is defined by the amount of money M i . That is, the strategy set for a consumer of type i is S
A strategy profile is given by a selection b(t) ∈ S i for every t ∈ I i such that b k (·) is a µ-integrable function for every natural number k. A profile β = (b(t)) t∈(0,n] , leads to a price at the trading post k defined by p k
Since, by assumption, endowments are interior points, there is a positive constant
3 Mackey continuity of preferences implies a myopic behavior of agents regarding future time periods, in the sense that both gains and losses in the distant future are negligible. Araujo (1985) shows that if we consider a larger class of preferences, as those that are continuous with respect to the norm topology, then equilibrium, and even any individually rational Pareto optimal allocation, might fail to exist. 4 See Garcia-Cutrín and Hervés-Beloso (1993) for further details. 5 Note that the fact that strategies are elements of + 1 is in accordance with the myopic behavior of consumers that comes from the Mackey continuity of preferences.
Thus, the price system p(β) ∈ 1 . Prices p k (β) at each trading post define the allocation that assigns to each consumer t ∈ I the bundle x t (β) as follows:
Note that if player t bids b k (t) = 0, the k-th coordinate of the commodity 301 bundle they receive is null and that, if almost every agent t bids b k (t) = 0, all 302 players receive 0. Moreover, it is easy to see that the sequence (x t,k (β)) k belongs 303 to + ∞ and, in addition, Apart from the allocation (x t,k (β)) k , agent t also obtains p(β) · ω t units of 307 money as sales revenue of their endowments. Thus, after returning the loan,
which becomes either a debt or a profit.
309
We emphasize that ∞ with the Mackey topology is a separable space and 310 the Mackey continuity of preferences guarantees existence of utility functions 311 U i , i = 1, . . . , n representing each preference relation. 6 The payoff function for
313 Let x * be the equal treatment competitive allocation associated with the equi-314 librium price p * previously chosen. Then, one can deduce that the symmetric 315 strategy profile β * , with b * k (t) = p * k · x * i,k for each k ∈ IN and t ∈ I i , is a Nash 316 equilibrium of the game defined. Moreover, p(β * ) = p * and x(β * ) = x * That is, 317 the type symmetric Nash equilibrium β * results in the competitive equilibrium 318 of the economy. To show this, note that if a consumer deviates from β * then the 319 price is not altered, and the bundle they get belongs to their budget set at such 320 a price. To be precise, letβ = (β * −t , b). denote the strategy profile that coincides 321 with β * except that a consumer t ∈ I i deviates and selects b instead of b * (t).
322
Then, the price system remains the same, i.e., p(β) = p * , and x t (β) is given by
325
In spite of the fact that our approach closely follows Dubey and Geanakoplos 326 (2003), the game we have presented could be essentially that of Shapley and Shubik (1977) . For it, consider the previous economy E = ( + ∞ , i , ω i ) i=1,...,n 328 that, under the established assumptions, has equilibrium (x * , p * ). From E and 329 (p * , x * ) we define the economyÊ where agents are endowed with an amount of fiat 330 money that is given by the value of their resources at price p * . To be precise, for 331 each sequencex = (x 0 , x) ∈ + ∞ , let the first coordinate k = 0 be a real number 332 that represents amount of money. 
trading post k ∈ IN, leading to the allocation that assigns to each consumer t ∈ I 341 the bundlex t (β) as follows:
A strategy profile β * = (b * (t)) t∈I , is a Nash equilibrium if no player has 343 incentives to deviate individually, i.e.,x t (β * )ˆ tx t (β * −t , b t ), for every b t ∈ S t and 344 every t ∈ I.
345
As before, one shows that the symmetric strategy profile β * , with b * k (t) = p * k · 346 x * i,k for each k ∈ IN and t ∈ I i , is a Nash equilibrium and results in the competitive 347 prices p * and allocation x * . Moreover, we observe that, in equilibrium, every agent 348 maintains their initial amount of money.
349
Therefore, given an equilibrium for an economy with infinitely many commo- in the game. We stress that the result holds for a finite number of goods.
355
To finish this section we show how the Schmeidler's game can be extended to economies with infinitely many commodites. For this, consider again the original
..,n . To define the associated gameà la Schmeidler, let be S i the strategy set of player i,
For each strategy profile s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) = ((x 1 , p 1 ), (x 2 , p 2 ), . . . , (x n , p n )), let A i (s), #A i (s) and γ i (s) be defined as in Section 3. Given the profile s, each player i receives f i (s), the bundle they choose adjusted by the average excess of demand of the players that proposes the same price.
Let (x * , p * ) be any Walrasian equilibrium of the economy
is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
358
For it, note that for any player i and for any strategy
we have, either p = p * or p = p * . If p = p * , then f i (s * −i , s i ) = ω i . If p = p * , then
In both cases, the output f i (s * −i , s i ) is in the budget set 361 at prices p * , and thus, we have f i (s * ) i f i (s * −i , s i ).
362
Remarks. The game associated to the economy E = ( Manipulability of the Walrasian mechanism has been thoroughly studied by con-387 sidering different scenarios and strategic considerations. In fact, it is known 388 that full information on consumers' true endowments is not always available and 389 obtaining such information is not easy and might be very costly. Thus, manip-390 ulation via misrepresentations of resources can be considered a quite common 391 situation. For example, when there is excess of supply for a commodity, those 392 who are endowed or produce it can sometimes manipulate prices to their benefit 393 by holding or even destroying part of it. Hence, by considering misrepresenta-394 tion of endowments, agents may have an incentive to deviate from a competitive 395 behavior and manipulate prices in their own benefit.
396
However, these strategic considerations are not addressed in the papers we 397 have referred to in this manuscript. Actually, in the games we have recapitu-398 lated agents put up their entire endowment for sale in the trading posts or it is 399 implicitly considered that endowments are known and there is no strategic be-400 havior on withholding resources. This issue is somehow remarked by the authors;
401
Shapley and Shubik (1977) argue that it is not difficult to modify the basic game 402 so that the goods do not necessarily all pass through the market before con-403 sumption, and a footnote in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) reads that the more 404 realistic assumption that agents sell what they want would be more complicated 405 but without affecting the result. However, a number of different considerations 406 and problems arise depending on how this is done and, even more, an explicit 407 analysis on the incentives that consumers may have, by withholding a portion of 408 their endowments in order to manipulate prices in their own benefit, is required. 409 We remark that incentives to deviate from a price-taking behavior have been 410 analyzed for the case in which the withheld bundles are destroyed or fully or 411 partially available for consumption (see, for instance, Roberts and Postlewaite, both consumption plans and commodity prices that coincide with the Walrasian expectations equilibria of the underlying economy.
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